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PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR PROGRAMMING: Is MODIFYING
SATELLITE DESCRAMBLERS A VIOLATION OF THE WIRETAP
LAW?
United States v. Hux, 940 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1991)
In United States v. Hux I the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Wire-
tap Law2 did not proscribe the modification of satellite descramblers to
receive encrypted programming.
3
On two occasions, an undercover agent requested that the defendant,
Austin Jerry Hux, modify a satellite descrambler module* to receive pre-
mium pay television channels without the user paying the provider of the
program.' Hux performed both of these modifications and received $400
for each.6
A Federal Grand Jury returned a four-count indictment against Hux:
two counts of manufacturing an electronic device for the purpose of sur-
reptitiously intercepting electronic communications under the Wiretap
1. 940 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1991).
2. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 2512(l)(b) (1988).
3. This Comment is limited to whether the Wiretap Law should apply to the modification of
satellite descramblers to receive encrypted television programming; it does not cover the unlawful
interception of other types of communication such as cable television (CATV), multi-point distribu-
tion system (MDS), or subscription television (STV). See Michael E. Di Geronimo, Protecting Wire-
less Communications: A Detailed Look at Section 605 of the Communications Act, 38 COMM. L.J.
411, 415-20 (1987).
4. 940 F.2d at 315. Hux modified a General Instruments VideoCipher II Satellite Descram-
bier Module. People alter these common descramblers so frequently that General Instruments of-
fered buyers of the illegally modified units an opportunity to replace them with legitimate units at a
reasonable price. Nationwide Program to Convert Owners of Illegally Modified Satellite TVDescram-
bers Extended, Business Wire, June 9, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Major Papers File.
The Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association estimates that roughly half of the
800,000 satellite descrambler boxes in use have been illegally modified. Sheila B. Mangel, Home
Satellite Viewers' Rights Revisited, 12 COMM. AND THE LAW, Dec. 1990, at 15, 28 (citing SPCA Sits
on Feud Over Program Access, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Nov. 6, 1989, at 32).
5. 940 F.2d at 315. The FBI analyzed the descrambler and found that Hux had modified its
computer chip intentionally. Thus the descrambler could receive all encrypted channels. Id. This
type of communication is called television-receive only (TVRO), and viewers need the descrambler
to receive those channels the cable company encrypts. The companies encrypt popular channels
such as HBO, Showtime, Cinemax, and The Movie Channel for which cable or satellite companies
charge a premium beyond the standard monthly rate. Di Geronimo, supra note 2, at 430-31. See
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Corinth Motel, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1186, 1188 (N.D. Miss. 1986).
6. 940 F.2d at 315. The FBI also obtained a search warrant for Hux's business, and the agents
found modified computer chips, programs to modify computer chips, and the tools necessary to
perform the modifications. Id.
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Law,7 and two counts of copyright infringement.' At trial the jury con-
victed Hux on all four counts and the trial court sentenced him to three
years' probation9 and a $40,000 fine.'0 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the copyright infringement counts, but reversed the convictions
under the Wiretap Law." The Eighth Circuit relied on the law's legisla-
tive history, 12 prior caselaw, 13 principles of statutory construction, and
the direct applicability of section 605 of the Communications Act 14 to
hold that the government may not prosecute a person under the Wiretap
Law for modifying a satellite descrambler to receive encrypted
programming."
To be convicted under section 2512(l)(b) of the Wiretap Law, a person
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(l)(b) (1988). Section 2512(l)(b) criminally sanctions anyone who inten-
tionally "manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells any electronic, mechanical, or other device,
knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the
purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications.... ." Id. See
infra notes 25-30.
8. 940 F.2d at 315. The copyright infringement claim was brought under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)
(1988). Id.
9. 940 F.2d at 315. Hux served six months of this probation in an in-home detention program.
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 318.
12. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2183; S.
REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555.
13. United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1991). See also Greek Radio Network of
America, Inc. v. Vlasopoulous, 731 F. Supp. 1227, 1232 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (sale of decoders allowing
unauthorized reception of radio communication not punishable under the Wiretap Law); Cox Cable
Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F. Supp. 376, 382 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (use of unauthorized cable
television descrambler not punishable under the Wiretap Law). But cf. United States v. McNutt,
908 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1990) (sale of modified descramblers is punishable under the Wiretap Law),
cert denied, III S. Ct. 955 (1991).
14.
Any person who manufactures, assembles, modifies, imports, sells, or distributes any elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other device or equipment, knowing or having reason to know that
the device or equipment is primarily of assistance in the unauthorized decryption of satel-
lite cable programming ... shall be fined not more than $500,000 for each violation, or
imprisoned for not more than 5 years for each violation, or both....
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) (1988).
Hux's type of conduct could be subject to civil and criminal penalties under § 605 of the Commu-
nications Act. See Cable/Home Communications Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 848
(11th Cir. 1990) (§ 605 "readily applies to proscribe pirate chips and other unauthorized decoding
devices, which enable third parties to receive television satellite transmissions intended for paying
subscribers") (citations omitted); ON/TV of Chicago v. Julien, 763 F.2d 839, 842-43 (7th Cir. 1985)
(sale of subscription television decoder kits violates § 605); National Subscription Television v. S. &
H. TV, 644 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1981) (same). See also infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
15. 940 F.2d at 318.
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must "intentionally" produce or sell a device knowing16 that the design
makes it "primarily useful" for the surreptitious interception of oral,
wire, or electronic communications.17 Courts have interpreted the "pri-
marily useful" language to mean that the device in question must have
few, if any, legitimate uses.18 Hux focused on whether section 2512(1)(b)
required that the modified satellite descrambler was "primarily useful"
for surreptitious interception of electronic communications, or was
merely used in a surreptitious manner to intercept electronic communi-
cations. The court also analyzed the applicability of both section 605 of
the Communications Act and section 2512 of the Wiretap Law to modi-
fying satellite descramblers. 19
Because of the advances in technology that had taken place since the
Wiretap Law's original enactment in 1968,20 Congress amended the
Wiretap Law21 in 1986 to protect against unauthorized interception of
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(l)(b) (1988). The person may also be convicted if they have reason to
know of these characteristics. Id. See supra note 7.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(l)(b) (1988). The section also requires that "such device or any compo-
nent portion thereof has been or will be sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce." Id. See supra note 7. Section 2512(l)(b) principally allows prosecution for the posses-
sion or manufacture of devices designed to intercept personal communications without authoriza-
tion. See United States v. Schweihs, 569 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Flowers v. Tandy
Corp., 773 F.2d 585, 588-89 (4th Cir. 1985) (§ 2512 cannot be used to create a civil cause of action
under § 2520 of the Wiretap Act).
18. United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932, 934 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v.
Schweihs, 569 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1978)).
19. 940 F.2d at 317-18. See generally Di Geronimo, supra note 3.
20. Congress originally promulgated the Wiretap Law in 1968 to protect the privacy of wire
and oral communications and to provide uniform conditions under which courts may authorize the
interception of such communications. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 12, at 2153. Congress drafted
Title III, the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance section of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, to meet the standards the Supreme Court set down in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 12, at 2153. Congress intended to combat
organized crime by allowing only law enforcement officers to conduct electronic surveillance. Id. at
2154-57. Congress specifically intended § 2512 to curtail the supply and availability of devices par-
ticularly suited to wiretapping and eavesdropping. Id. at 2183. The law prohibits the narrow cate-
gory of devices whose principal use is likely for wiretapping or eavesdropping. Congress gave
examples of these prohibited devices: the martini olive transmitter; the spike mike; the infinity trans-
mitter; and the microphone disguised as a wristwatch, picture frame, cuff link, or cigarette pack.
However, since Congress did not want to interfere with the production or distribution of legitimate
electronics equipment, they required that the device be primarily useful for surreptitious listening.
Id.
21. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3555. The substantive changes replaced "willfully" with
"intentionally" and added the phrase "or electronic" to the section. Id. at 3574-77. The later 1986
amendment served "to update and clarify federal privacy protections and standards in light of dra-
matic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies." Id.
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electronic communications.22 Although the legislative history of the
1986 amendment directly discusses several areas of new coverage, such
as electronic mail, cellular telephones, and electronic bulletin boards, it
left the private viewing of the satellite pay-television industry to the
Communications Act.23 Courts have interpreted the effect of the changes
in the statute differently.24
The Fifth Circuit established the standard for applying pre-amend-
ment section 2512(l)(b) to intercepting devices in United States v.
Schweihs.25 The court determined that Congress intended section
2512(1)(b) to ban the manufacture, possession, or sale of a narrow cate-
gory of devices that by design are primarily useful for eavesdropping and
wiretapping.26 The court, relying on the legislative history of section
2512,27 concluded that a violation of the section required the possession
of a device designed for covert listening, rather than the surreptitious use
of a legitimate electronic device.28 The defendant used an ordinary am-
plifier, with undisputed legitimate uses,29 to monitor alarm signals in the
course of a robbery. Because of the legitimate uses that the defendant
22. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3555-57.
23. Id. at 3562-63. "[Plrivate viewing of satellite cable programming, network feeds and cer-
tain audio subcarriers will continue to be governed exclusively by section 705 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 [codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1988)], and not by [the Wiretap Law]." Id. at 3576.
See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) (1988).
24. It is not clear whether the pre-1986 version of the Wiretap Law would apply to the manu-
facture of satellite cable programming decoders. The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Herring,
933 F.2d 932, 934 (11th Cir. 1991), found that the pre-amendment version of § 2512(l)(b) did not
apply to a person modifying such a descrambler. However, in United States v. McNutt, 908 F.2d
561, 565 (10th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 955 (1991), the Tenth Circuit determined that the
legislative history was ambiguous and held that the plain language of § 2512(1)(b) supported a cause
of action for the same activities. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text. But see 47 U.S.C.
§ 605 (1988); infra note 42.
25. 569 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1978). At trial in the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, the jury convicted Schweihs of willful and knowing possession of an electronic device that,
by virtue of its design, was primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of wire or oral commu-
nications. Id. at 966.
26. Id. at 968. See also United States v. Pritchard, 773 F.2d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1985) (the
design of the device must render it primarily useful for surreptitious listening, but the device need
not be disguised in order to be prohibited), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1085 (1986).
27. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 2183-84.
28. 569 F.2d at 969. See also Flowers v. Tandy Corp., 773 F.2d 585, 588-89 (4th Cir. 1985)
(legitimate uses of device remove it from the proscription of § 2512).
29. 569 F.2d at 969-70. The court reasoned that an ordinary amplifier's primary uses are, by
design, legitimate and thus its possession could not be the basis of a violation. On the other hand, a
proscribed device is one whose primary uses, by design, are surreptitious interception of private
communications. Id. at 970-71.
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could have made of the amplifier, the court reversed Schweihs' convic-
tion under the Wiretap law.3"
The Tenth Circuit was the first circuit to apply the amended section
2512(l)(b) to modifying satellite descramblers. In United States v. Mc-
Nutt,3 the court held that the defendant properly could be charged
under the Wiretap Law for altering satellite descramblers to allow unau-
thorized interception of satellite programming.32 The defendant argued
that section 2512(1)(b)'s legislative history indicated that satellite pro-
gramming was not electronic communication under the definition of the
Wiretap Law and, therefore, that the section should not apply.33 The
court disagreed, finding the legislative history ambiguous.34 The court
further determined that the Wiretap Law's definition of electronic com-
munications 35 encompassed satellite television signals and thus ruled that
30. Id. at 971.
31. 908 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 955 (1991). In the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, the jury convicted McNutt of: 1) conspiring
to traffic in a counterfeit access device, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (1988); and 2) conspiring to
manufacture, possess, or sell a surreptitious interception device in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2512(l)(b)
(1988). Id. at 562.
32. 908 F.2d at 565. To receive a scrambled satellite transmission, a satellite dish owner must
purchase a descrambler box. A legally purchased descrambler includes its own unique encoded
"address." To descramble the signal, the descrambler-box owner must pay the proper company a fee
and report to the company his descrambler-box "address" number. The company then includes in
its encrypted signal a code that allows the descrambler box with the authorized address to descram-
ble the subscribed satellite signal. Since no two legally purchased descrambler boxes contain the
same "address," this system allows the satellite transmission to restrict descrambling of its signals to
only those descrambler boxes authorized to receive the signal. Id. at 562-63.
McNutt, by cloning a descrambler box, was copying the "unique" address number from one
descrambler box into other descrambler boxes. Consequently, as long as the owner of the original
descrambler box continued to pay for an unscrambled signal, all of the cloned descrambled boxes
would be able to descramble the signal as well. Id.
33. Id. See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3566-69. See infra notes 80-83 and accompany-
ing text.
34. 908 F.2d at 564. The legislative history states that a "communication is an electronic com-
munication protected by the Federal Wiretap Law if it is not carried by sound waves and cannot be
fairly characterized as containing the human voice." S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3568. Com-
munications consisting solely of data and those that are transmitted only by radio are examples of
electronic communications. Id. The juxtaposition of the "cannot be fairly characterized as contain-
ing the human voice" language with the listing of video teleconferencing as an example of protected
communication confused the Tenth Circuit, because video teleconferencing undoubtedly includes
the human voice. 908 F.2d at 564. The court also noted repeated references in the legislative history
to the problems associated with the unauthorized interception of satellite television broadcasts. Id.
at 564-65. See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3560-61, 3573.
35. Electronic communication is "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data,
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
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section 2512 did apply.36 The court determined that the interception was
sufficiently surreptitious to fall within the condemnation of section 2512
because the providers of the satellite service were unaware that the users
of the descramblers were intercepting their programming. 37
The Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in United States
v. Herring. " In Herring a group of defendants sold to the public modi-
fied descramblers that would intercept encrypted satellite program-
ming. 3  The court examined section 2512 in pre-amendment and post
amendment form and determined that neither version applied to the de-
fendants' conduct.' Noting that a device must have few, if any, nonsur-
reptitious and legitimate uses to be prohibited by section 2512, the court
held that the modified descrambler had legitimate uses4 and, therefore,
that neither version of section 2512 prohibited it. The court then deter-
mined, however, that section 605(e)(4) of the Communications Act 42
clearly prohibited the defendants' conduct of modifying the satellite
descramblers.43
The Eleventh Circuit proceeded to compare the application of the two
statutes to the defendant's conduct and determined that section 605(e)(4)
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(12) (1988). See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3568-69.
36. 908 F.2d at 564. "The clarity of the statutory language contrasted with the ambiguity in
the legislative history obliges us to follow the plain wording of the statute." Id. at 565.
37. Id.
38. 933 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1991). In the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Alabama, the jury convicted three of four defendants of both conspiracy to violate and a violation
of § 2512(l)(b). The jury convicted the fourth defendant on the conspiracy count only. Id. at 933.
39. Id. at 932.
40. Id. at 935. The court noted the absence of discussion about satellite pay television in the
statute, and determined that there was also no evidence of intent to "broaden the meaning of'surrep-
titious' to encompass devices that have legitimate uses but whose owners use them illegiti-
mately .. " Id. at 935. See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3574-77 (the only changes to § 2512
were minor).
41. 933 F.2d at 934. There was testimony that the decoders were useful to receive scrambled
signals that did not require authorization. Id. It is, however, questionable whether there are legiti-
mate uses for an illegally modified descrarnbler. See infra notes 75-78.
42. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4746.
43. 933 F.2d at 935-37. The legislative history to § 605 states that if a person not authorized to
receive an encrypted satellite program intercepts a program, the programmer can use the strength-
ened penalties and remedies provided in § 605. The language specifically includes those who assist in
receiving such communications through the sale or manufacture of illegal equipment. See 130
CONG. REc. 14286, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4745-46 (statement of Sen. Robert W.
Packwood). See also 933 F.2d at 935 (the better interpretation prohibits both viewing and assisting
in viewing unauthorized satellite programming); S. REp. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3576.
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was more appropriate for three reasons." First, the court cited the rule
that courts must interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the
accused.4" Second, the court noted the absence of any discussion of satel-
lite pay-television in the 1986 amendment to the Wiretap statute.16 Fi-
nally, the court applied the rule that a newly enacted statute drawn in
general terms does not negate the efficacy of an earlier, more specific
statute. 7 Although the court then determined that the statutes did not
overlap,48 it further reasoned that, even if they did, section 2512(1)(b)'s
ambiguity would require prosecution under the more specific section
605.19 Thus the Eleventh Circuit held that a person who modified a satel-
lite descrambler could not be charged under section 2512.50
The current version of section 605 clearly prohibits the use, manufac-
ture, and sale of devices that allow the unauthorized reception of televi-
sion programming." In Cox Cable Cleveland Area v. King5 2 a federal
district court in Ohio determined that the sale, installation, and use of
devices intended for unauthorized reception of premium cable channel
programming violated the original section 605.53 The defendants sold
decoders that allowed users to receive scrambled cable programming
without paying the monthly subscription fee.54 The court held that the
Wiretap Law55 did not apply to this conduct and specifically stated that
44. 933 F.2d. at 937. The court also noted, in support of its analysis, that the greater fiscal
penalties for violations of § 605 are consistent with its prohibition of primarily economic conduct, in
contrast with the higher levels of imprisonment § 2512(1)(b) establishes, which accord with its goal
of deterring the more invasive crime of intercepting personal communications. Id at 937-38.
45. Id. at 937 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
46. Id. at 935.
47. Id. at 938 (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)).
48. Id. at 938. See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3573 ("if an individual violates the
criminal prohibitions in section 633 of the Communications Act, he cannot also be charged under
chapters 119 or 121 of title 18"). See also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (prosecu-
tor has the right to choose the statute under which an indictment will be brought if statutes overlap).
49. 933 F.2d at 938. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976).
50. 933 F.2d at 935.
51. See United States v. Stone, 546 F. Supp. 234, 239 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (criminal provisions of
§ 605 apply to sellers of devices that intercept microwave pay-television transmissions); United
States v. Westbrook, 502 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (same). See also ON/TV of Chicago
v. Julien, 763 F.2d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 1985) (those who manufacture or sell unauthorized descram-
blers for subscription television are liable under the civil provisions of § 605); National Subscription
Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Cox Cable Cleveland Area v.
King, 582 F. Supp. 376, 380 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (same).
52. 582 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
53. Id. at 380.
54. Id. at 378-79.
55. Id. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988).
1992]
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the Wiretap Law prohibited only private surveillance.5 6 Thus the Wire-
tap Law prohibits surreptitious efforts to learn the contents of private
business or personal communications, but not the unlawful interception
of public communications such as cable television programming.
5 7
In Greek Radio Network of America v. Vlasopoulous,"8 a federal dis-
trict court in Pennsylvania held that amended section 605, and not the
Wiretap Law, prohibited the unauthorized interception of subscription
radio services.5 9 The defendants modified and sold radio units that al-
lowed unauthorized listeners to obtain the programming carried on a
separate radio channel unavailable to the public.6 The court followed
Cox Cable in deciding that the Wiretap Law prevented unlawful surveil-
lance of private business or personal communications and did not pro-
vide a plaintiff with a cause of action for the unauthorized interception of
its radio transmissions.61
In United States v. Hux 62 the Eighth Circuit explicitly followed the
Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Herring to determine that section
2512(1)(b) does not apply to the modification of satellite descramblers. 63
The defendant argued that section 2512(1)(b) did not proscribe his con-
duct and that prosecution was limited to section 605(e)(4). 64 Hux relied
56. 582 F. Supp. at 382.
57. Id. The Cox Cable court relied on legislative history contained in the reports for the 1968
wiretap statute to conclude that the wiretap statutes were enacted with the exclusive purpose of
protecting private communications.
See also Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (a private call cannot be
intercepted; a business exception to the Wiretap Law exists only to determine the nature of a call and
never its contents); Edwards v. State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 1987) (the Wiretap
Law requires a subjective expectation of privacy that is justifiable under the circumstances; because
user of cellular phone did not have such expectation, no violation of pre-1986 Wiretap Law); Flow-
ers v. Tandy Corp., 773 F.2d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1985) (§ 2512 does not imply a private cause of
action against a manufacturer or seller of a device primarily useful for wiretapping); Greek Radio
Network of America, Inc. v. Vlasopoulous, 731 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (Wiretap Law does
not provide a cause of action for interception of scrambled radio transmissions).
58. 731 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
59. Id. at 1230-32.
60. Id. at 1229. The plaintiff sent out programming on a separate subcarrier frequency that
could be received only with a special unit, or one of the illegally modified units.
61. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. Before Congress amended § 605 of the
Communications Act, courts implied a private cause of action through the application of a four-part
test set out in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See Chartwell Communications Group v. West-
brook, 637 F.2d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 1980) (private cause of action implied under § 605 for television
programmer against seller of unauthorized decoder boxes).
62. 940 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1991).
63. Id. at 318.
64. Id. at 316.
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on the Fifth Circuit analysis in Schweihs, which held that a device must
have few, if any, legitimate uses to violate section 2512(1)(b),65 and on
the Eleventh Circuit analysis in Herring, which specifically held that sec-
tion 2512(1)(b) did not apply to the modification of satellite descram-
blers.66 The government contended, on the other hand, that the language
of section 2512(l)(b) indeed proscribed Hux's conduct and that the
charge was proper,67 arguing that McNutt supported the position that
section 2512(l)(b) applied to the modification of satellite descramblers.68
The Hux court cited several factors in deciding to follow the reasoning
of Herring. First, the Eighth Circuit looked to the legislative history of
2512(l)(b), deciding to read the statute to prohibit devices designed for
use in a surreptitious manner, rather than to prohibit the surreptitious
use of a legitimate device.69 Second, the language of section 605, and its
designation as the sole authority governing "the private viewing of satel-
lite cable programming" in the legislative history of section 2512(1)(b),70
convinced the court that section 605 directly applied to the modification
of descramblers, while section 2512(l)(b)'s application was speculative at
best.7 The persuasiveness of the principles of statutory construction
used in Herring, 72 and the lack of depth in the McNutt analysis,73 led the
Eighth Circuit to hold section 2512(l)(b) inapplicable and to reverse
Hux's conviction under that section.74
The dissent believed the majority's interpretation of section 2512(1)(b)
and its legislative history to be too narrow.7 5 The dissent disagreed with
the majority's reasoning that a modified satellite descrambler had suffi-
cient legitimate uses to prevent the application of section 2512(1)(b).7 6
Instead, the dissent argued that the specifically surreptitious characteris-
65. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
66, 940 F.2d at 317. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
67. 940 F.2d at 317.
68. Id. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
69. 940 F.2d at 317. See supra notes 26-29.
70. See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3576.
71. 940 F.2d at 316.
72, See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
73. 940 F.2d at 318. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that McNutt incor-
rectly interpreted the word "surreptitiously" for the purpose of § 2512(1)(b). Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 319 (Ross, J., dissenting). See also S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3566-70.
76, 940 F.2d at 320. The majority in Hux relied on testimony from Herring stating that modi-
fied descramblers had legitimate uses. Id. at 317 (citing United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932, 934
(llth Cir. 1991)).
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tic of the counterfeit descrambler was the fact that it facially appeared to
be a legitimate descrambler, and further that the device had no legitimate
use.7 7 On these grounds, the dissent asserted that Hux's actions fell
within the prohibition that the language and legislative history of section
2512(l)(b) established, and that his conviction should stand.78
While the Hux court reached the correct result, it did not employ the
best reasoning. Although both statutes appear to apply on their face,
proper statutory interpretation requires that a defendant be charged only
with a section 605 violation for modifying satellite descramblers.
Considering the language of the 1984 amendment and the legislative
history of section 605, it is clear that section 605 directly proscribes the
modification of satellite descramblers.79 On the other hand, the Wiretap
Law seeks to prevent unauthorized interception of personal or point-to-
point communication.80 Satellite transmissions of the type involved in
Hux, while not open to the public, 81 are, nevertheless, not electronic
communications in the same sense as private individual communication
or the transfer of corporate data. "Electronic communication" may, in
its broadest terms, encompass the transmission of such television pro-
gramming; but the legislative history, subsequent caselaw, and the com-
parison with section 605 precludes that conclusion. 82  The legislative
history of the Wiretap Law supports this analysis8 3 and indicates con-
gressional intent to charge defendants only with violations of the more
precise statute.84
Given the rules of statutory construction, 5 the Eighth Circuit soundly
determined that Hux could be charged with a section 605 violation alone.
However, the court should have relied solely on this statutory compari-
77. Id. at 319-20 (Ross, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 320.
79. See supra note 14. The language of § 605 clearly prohibits the exact conduct of the Hux
defendants. 47 U.S.C. § 605(3)(4) (1988).
80. See supra notes 52-57, 58-61 and accompanying text.
81. The encryption of such programming indicates that it is not open to the public. H.R. REP.
No. 934, supra note 42, at 4746. See United States v. Westbrook, 502 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mich.
1980); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Corinth Motel, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Miss. 1986).
82. See supra notes 42-50, 69-74 and accompanying text.
83. A defendant who violates the Communications Act by intercepting or assisting in the inter-
ception of cable television without authorization can only be charged with the Communications Act
violation and not a Wiretap Law violation. See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 12, at 3573. It appears
in this instance that both statutes apply to the conduct, but that Congress intended the more direct
statute to control. See also Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976).
84. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 153.
85. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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son, rather than on a questionable characterization that modified
descramblers have legitimate uses, to conclude that section 2512 does not
apply to the modification of satellite descramblers8 6
Thomas N. FitzGibbon
86. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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